

# Quick Takes

JANUARY 2019

TIMELY TOPICS FOR INSURANCE EXECUTIVES

## IN THIS ISSUE ▶

Record Pace of CLO Issuance

*Page 4*

Impact on Investment Grade

*Page 6*

Key Takeaways

*Page 7*

For more information on this topic,  
contact the authors:



**Andy Brown**

Senior Research Analyst  
andy.brown@neamgroup.com



**Patrick Macary**

Senior Research Analyst  
patrick.macary@neamgroup.com

[neamgroup.com](http://neamgroup.com)

## High [Yield] Anxiety?

We look at high yield bonds and leveraged loans to assess the potential risks and what this could mean for the broader corporate market.

### BACKGROUND

There are times when investors need to look in unfamiliar and perhaps riskier places to see which way the winds of fortune might be shifting. For example, what can conditions in leveraged markets tell us about high grade corporate bonds? Leveraged capital structures are more sensitive and vulnerable to changes in the overall financial market and as conditions change, these securities often signal danger lying ahead for investment grade bonds.

Is the leveraged market currently telling investors anything about future dangers? Certainly there are signs that fundamentals and prices are pointing toward a tough environment for below investment grade securities. Let's take a closer look at the leveraged finance markets to assess the underlying risks and what this might mean for the broader corporate market. The most relevant gauges include:


- Size of the market and ratings quality distribution
- Leveraged buyout (LBO) activity
- Loan covenant trends
- Growth of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) and
- Changes in credit fundamentals

### SIZE AND QUALITY CHANGES IN THE LEVERAGED FINANCE MARKETS

Post the financial crisis in 2008-2009, the U.S. Fed and other central banks flooded the market with easy credit and liquidity, driving interest rates to historically low levels for an extended period of time. This has been a positive for borrowers, who benefited from cheaper capital and lower interest expense but less so for fixed income investors, who have often shifted into lower rated, higher yielding bonds. In light of these market conditions, the amount of outstanding high yield bonds and leveraged loans has increased substantially. Total leveraged


debt [bonds and loans] amounts to over \$2.2 trillion, twice what it was in 2007 and ~7 times 1997's total [Chart 1]. Additionally, a large percentage of lower rated securities currently comprise the high yield bond and leveraged loan markets [Chart 2] which is notable because default rates grow exponentially as ratings get progressively lower.

**Chart 1. High Yield Market Par Outstanding**



Source: Wells Fargo Securities, Bloomberg Index Services Ltd., S&P LCD

**Chart 2. High Yield Market Ratings Distribution**



Source: Wells Fargo Securities, Bloomberg Index Services Ltd., S&P LCD


Initially, companies used easier liquidity to shore up balance sheets by paying down debt and refinancing bonds at lower rates as opposed to “shareholder friendly activities” (i.e. increased dividends or buybacks). The more time passed, however, companies shifted their focus to shareholder rewards rather than on bolstering their balance sheets. This attitude is also reflected in the increased number of leveraged buyouts (LBOs).

**UPTICK IN LEVERAGED BUYOUT ACTIVITY**

U.S. LBO volumes have increased to their highest levels since the financial crisis [Chart 3]. Increases in LBO deal flow have often occurred during (with the benefit of hindsight) what turn

out to be market peaks. Given higher leverage and lower interest coverage these transactions tend to be more equity friendly. In a historical reversal, recent LBO-related financing has been concentrated in the loan market. The approximately \$100 billion in this type of issuance dwarfs the ~\$10 billion of LBO related high yield issuance in 2018 (Chart 4). Although LBO activity remains below pre-crisis levels, the steady increase over the past few years should be a concern.

**Chart 3. U.S. Leveraged Buyout Transaction Volume**



Source: Credit Suisse, S&P LCD

**Chart 4. LBO Volume – High Yield Bond vs. Bank Loan Financing**



Source: Credit Suisse, S&P LCD

**COVENANTS ARE GETTING MORE PERMISSIVE AS RATING QUALITY DECLINES**


Due to the robust credit and market conditions of the past few years, there has been very little systemic distress. One area of concern has been the diminished covenant protection on new deals. Covenant-lite loan issuance remained high at ~85% of overall issuance in 2018 per S&P LCD. To gauge covenant quality, Moody's tracks numerous metrics, including leverage requirements and the seniority of lenders' claims, then scores the average strength on a scale

of 1 to 5. The higher the number, the weaker the covenant. Moody's Covenant Quality Indicator (CQI) now sits at 4.13 which is very close to the weakest score yet recorded. This is important to note because the erosion of covenant quality will likely put pressure on recovery rates as these lower rated companies could continue to have incremental borrowing capacity during the next downturn.

### RECORD PACE OF CLO ISSUANCE


Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs), structured securities which are developed around bank loans, are driving demand for new bank loan products and also incentivizing easier covenants. Record CLO issuance (Chart 5) continues to fuel demand and now more than 50% of leveraged loans are placed into CLOs (Chart 6). These structures are sensitive to rating changes, despite not being marked-to-market and could raise volatility in the loan market in the event of an increase in rating downgrades and issuer defaults.

**Chart 5. CLO Issuance by Year**



Source: Credit Suisse, S&P LCD

**Chart 6. CLO Market Statistics**




Source: Credit Suisse, S&P LCD

## FUNDAMENTALS ARE STABLE FOR NOW


As of the end of November 2018, the 12-month trailing, issuer-weighted default rates for U.S. high yield and leveraged loan issuers stood at 3.3% and 1.6%, respectively (Chart 7). Expectations are that default risk will likely remain on the benign side in 2019, driven by low recession risk and the low likelihood of an idiosyncratic industry shock, similar to energy in 2014-2015. Although many investors have turned more cautious on the debt servicing capacity of high yield bond issuers, the low recession risk should also limit the likelihood of a significant decline in the near-term. As shown in Chart 8, interest coverage ratios have actually been improving among both high yield and leveraged loan issuers, boosted by the recent rebound in earnings growth.

**Chart 7. Default for High Yield Bond and Leveraged Loan Issuers**



Source: Moody's, S&P Capital IQ LCD, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

**Chart 8. Median Interest Coverage Ratios for High Yield Bond and Leveraged Loan Issuers**




Source: S&P Capital IQ LCD, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

## IMPACT ON INVESTMENT GRADE

We note that concerns over a potential wave of high yield downgrades among BBB rated issuers will likely continue to mount. As a result of more shareholder-friendly financial policies, despite rising cash flows, the overall investment grade index has a much higher percentage of BBBs than it has in the past with almost 50% compared to 32% in 2010 (Chart 9). In addition, 40% of BBBs are now leveraged greater than 4x debt/EBITDA\*, more indicative of BB credit quality than investment grade. In anticipation of the more difficult credit landscape foreshadowed by leveraged markets coupled with tighter spreads, we currently have an up-in-quality bias. We have been investing for our clients in companies with stronger balance sheets and financial flexibility while selling those credits that we believe face longer-term challenges. We are also taking advantage of spreads widening in higher quality names as the market experiences bouts of volatility.

\* Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization

**Chart 9. BBB Rated Bonds as Percentage of IG Market**



Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

---

## KEY TAKEAWAYS

- We are seeing characteristics in both leveraged bonds and loans which could lead to worse recoveries in the next downturn.
- Leveraged borrowers have been the beneficiaries of higher demand from yield-seeking investors who have been increasingly willing to trade easier terms for yield.
- Weaker balance sheets and easier covenants could lead to higher levels of distress than otherwise would have been the case when the next downturn does hit the market.
- While near-term recession and default risks are low, the seeds for potential stress have been sown and are an indication that headwinds are building for the corporate bond market.
- Our current investment strategy for clients in the investment grade corporate sector is focused on three areas: 1) buying higher quality credits 2) selling credits with deteriorating fundamentals and 3) buying bonds of companies whose spreads have widened materially but we are comfortable owning from a credit perspective.



**neamgroup.com**

Connecticut | California | Dublin | London

© 2019 New England Asset Management, Inc.

*All rights reserved. This publication has been prepared solely for general informational purposes and does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation with respect to any particular security, investment product or strategy. Nothing contained herein constitutes an offer to provide investment or money management services, nor is it an offer to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained herein, neither New England Asset Management, Inc. ("NEAM, Inc.") nor New England Asset Management Limited (together, "NEAM") guarantee the completeness, accuracy or timeliness of this publication and any opinions contained herein are subject to change without notice. This publication may not be reproduced or disseminated in any form without express written permission. NEAM, Inc. is an SEC registered Investment Advisor located in Farmington, CT. This designation does not imply a certain level of skill or training. In the EU this publication is presented by New England Asset Management Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of NEAM, Inc. with offices located in Dublin, Ireland and London, UK. New England Asset Management Limited is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland. New England Asset Management Limited is authorised by the Central Bank of Ireland and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority are available from us on request.*